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Abstract: This article conducts a detailed analysis of the concept of economic depen-
dence and exploitative abuse based on how their treatment in competition law and 
economics and their enforcement in European case law have evolved. Although the 
theoretical roots of these concepts lie in economic theory, these issues have been 
ignored or considered only scantily in the context of competition law enforcement. 
An effects-based approach should take these problems into account and could pro-
vide insights into how to portray the impacts of these abuses. We draw on two exa-
mples – from the agri-food industries and the digital economy – of relevant economic 
dependence issues. This paper highlights the existence of a paradox: although in-
dustrial organization models provide relevant tools to characterize these abuses, as-
sess their effects, and devise remedies, it seems that they are seldom used by com-
petition law enforcers. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Although the theoretical basis of exploitative abuse once formed the cornerstone of 
the original European Union (EU) competition policy, such cases have become mar-
ginal in EU competition law enforcement by now. While exploitative abuse initially 
was considered the only case to which article 102 applied, Court of Justice case-law 
(e.g., Continental Can,1 Hoffmann-La Roche2) has promoted a shift towards exclusi-
onary abuse cases along with an increasing neglect of exploitative abuse cases. The 
related case of abuse of economic dependence is even more specific.3 In contrast to 
EU competition law, French, Italian, German, Portuguese, and Greek competition 
laws include specific provisions in this regard4. For example, French competition law 
sanctions abuse of economic dependence by considering: i) the company’s share of 
its partner(s) turnover, ii) brand awareness, iii) the importance of partner’s market 
share, iv) the existence (or not) of alternative solutions, v) the factors that led to the 
situation of dependence (strategic choice or “forced” on the victim). In the ongoing 
antitrust reform debate in Germany, a strengthening and expansion of competition 
policy combating economic dependence abuses is intensively discussed (Budzinski & 
Stöhr, 2018). 
Under EU case-law, the concept of economic dependence is contained in Court of 
Justice (CJ) case law.5 The notion emerged in the case British Leyland6 in 1986 but 
related closely to the legal monopoly rights granted to a trade partner. Similarly, its 
uses in the Deutsche Bahn and Aéroports de Paris cases in 1997 and 2000 respectively 
                                                          
1  Judgment of the Court on February 21, 1973, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can 
Company Inc. v Commission of the European Communities, Case 6-72. 
2 Judgment of the Court on February 13, 1979 - Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the 
European Communities, Case 85/76. 
3 See for a comprehensive presentation of the legal provisions related to economic dependence the 
2008 International Competition Network report. 
4  See Fabbio (2006) and Falce (2015) for Italy, OECD (1998, p.55) for Germany and Portugal, and 
Truli (2017) for Greece. 
5 EU regulation includes no clear definition of the concept but case-law insists on the concept of an 
unavoidable trading partner: “An undertaking which has a very large market share and holds it for 
some time, by means of the volume of production and the scale of the supply which it stands for 
[…] is by virtue of that share in a position of strength which makes it an unavoidable trading 
partner and which, already because of this secures for it, at the very least during relatively long 
periods, that freedom of action which is the special feature of a dominant position.” (op.cit.). 
6  CJEU, C-226/84, British Leyland Public Limited Company vs. Commission, November 11, 1986. 
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were also related exclusively to legal monopoly issues.7 Similarly, in an April 2017 
opinion issued in the context of a request for a preliminary ruling by the Latvian 
Supreme Court, Advocate General Nils Wahl stated that such abuses are rightly consi-
dered with extreme reluctance in EU case law because of the risk of false positive 
decisions.8 According to him, one can only observe such cases in regulated markets. 
In other words, the concept of economic dependence has been applied only in the 
case of firms benefiting from exclusive legal rights and not against firms whose mar-
ket position was based on merit. However, characterizing abusive behavior by an 
incumbent with an exclusive-rights-based market position does not involve the de-
monstration of anticompetitive effects on the market.9 Therefore, competition law 
does not provide a test or a set of criteria to identify such abuses with respect to 
market transactions among private undertakings.  
From an economics perspective, neglecting cases of exploitative abuses and abuses 
of economic dependence seems contradictory in the context of an effects-based ap-
proach. Modern industrial organization (IO) theory shows a number of case constel-
lations, in which anticompetitive effects can follow from such abuses. Therefore, our 
objective in this paper is to demonstrate the importance of exploitative and economic 
dependence abuses in an economics-oriented implementation of EU competition 
law. We show that despite its imperfections, competition law enforcement is best-
suited to deal with exploitative and economic dependence abuse issues. In doing so, 
we focus on the characterization of these abuses and provide only some insights into 
possible remedies (for an analysis of these issues see Këllezi, 2008). We do not 
                                                          
7  General Court, T-22/94, Deutsche Bahn A.G. vs. Commission, October 21, 1997 and T-128/98, 
Aéroports de Paris vs. Commission, December 12, 2000. 
8  Opinion of the Advocate General Nils Wahl, Case C-177/16, Biedrība ‘Autortiesību un komu-
nicēšanās konsultāciju aģentūra – Latvijas Autoru apvienība’ v Konkurences padome, 6 April 2017. 
9 See e.g. EU Commission Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in applying Article 
82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (EU Commission, 
OJ C 45, 24.2.2009, pp. 7–20) and especially Art. 82 related to sanction of refusal to deal. An 
effects-based approach is not required since “the upstream market position of the dominant un-
dertaking has been developed under the protection of special or exclusive rights or has been fi-
nanced by state resources”. In contrast, the otherwise dominant effects-based approach in EU 
competition policy is “focuse[d] on the presence of anti-competitive effects that harm consumers, 
and is based on the examination of each specific case, based on sound economics and grounded 
on facts” (Rey, 2005, p. 2.).  
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address the specific case of abuse of economic dependence by a firm with no market 
power10, or in the context of merger control.11 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses why an economics-
oriented approach to competition law enforcement should address exploitative abu-
ses and economic dependence abuses. Section 3 investigates the main body of mo-
dern IO theory on exploitative and economic dependence issues, i) in general, ii) with 
respect to the agri-food sector and iii) related to the digital economy. Eventually, 
section 4 discusses competition policy implications. 
 
2. WHY SHOULD AN ECONOMICS-ORIENTED APPROACH ADDRESS ECONOMIC 
DEPENDENCE? 
2.1. EU Competition law enforcement: why are exploitative and economic de
 pendence abuses neglected? 
2.1.1. A lost continent in relation to decision practice? 
In the context of abuse cases we can distinguish two main types: exploitative and 
exclusionary abuses. While both types originally were at the heart of competition 
policy, one type of abuse has emerged as much more prominent. Exclusionary abuses 
were are the top of legal agendas in the 1970s promoted by the 1973 Court of Justice 
decision in the Continental Can case, and have remained relevant as can be seen in 
the remarkable decisions in July 2018 in the Android case, in June 2017 in the Google 
Shopping case, and in January 2018 in the Qualcomm case. 12  In contrast, the 
longstanding disregard of exploitative abuses in EU competition law is exemplified 
by two observations. The first is related to the European Commission’s (EC) February 
2009 communication on its enforcement priorities in relation to article 102. This 
                                                          
10  An abuse of economic dependence may be at stake even if the contractual partner does not enjoy 
a dominant position, for instance, if one of the partners has made specific investments it cannot 
recoup if the contractual relationship ends. 
11 For instance, the European Commission (EC) took into consideration similar dimensions in its as-
sessment of the Rewe/Meinl merger case (European Commission, Decision 1999/674/EC 
Rewe/Meinl (1999) OJ L 274/1). See e.g. Këllezi (2008). 
12  The fines imposed in these cases amounted to €997 million for Qualcomm (IP/18/421, January 24, 
2018), €2.42 billion for Google Shopping (IP/17/1784, June 27, 2017), and € 4.34 billion for And-
roid (IP/18/4581, July 18, 2018). 
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communication deals only with exclusionary abuses and completely ignores exploi-
tative abuses. It seems clear that although initially core to competition law this type 
of abuse is no longer a priority for competition law enforcement. The second obser-
vation derives from the Court of Justice (CJ) decisional practice, specifically a 1978 
abuse of economic dependence case which occurred outside the regulated industries 
borders. It concerned the oil industry post the 1973 crisis. BP was accused of an 
abuse to the detriment of one of its customers (ABG). Despite BP’s market share 
(26%), the EC considered article 102 to apply. However, this decision was annulled 
by the CJ on the grounds that the buyer’s economic dependence on its own is not 
sufficient for the finding of a dominant position in the relevant market.13 
One of the most recent uses of the concept of exploitative abuse was in a case against 
S&P for its abusive practices in the international securities identification numbers 
(ISIN) market.14 The competition concerns (not the statement of objections) commu-
nicated by the EC focused on the mandatory purchase by firms of additional financial 
information using these ISIN codes even if the user did not need them. The alleged 
exploitative abuse was related to this forced sale. However, two remarks should be 
made here. The first is that the case was settled through article 9 of EU Regulation 
1/2003, i.e. through a negotiated procedure and, thus, with no decision ruling on 
the matter. Consequently, the EC was not required to publicly establish a theory of 
damage, and the defendant was not required to discuss this theory or to develop an 
efficiency-based defense. This deprives us of any legal discussion or economic test 
that would characterize the exploitative abuse. The available legal knowledge may 
have been impaired by this relaxation of the struggle for law (Wagner-von Papp, 
2012). A second point is that exclusive rights by regulation again play a crucial role 
in this case. While S&P cannot be considered to be a state-owned firm, it enjoys an 
exclusive legal right to provide the ISINs for all securities issued on the U.S. financial 
market. This, again, is far from an abuse of economic dependence among firms ope-
rating in a purely private market.15  
                                                          
13  ABG/oil companies operating in the Netherlands, Case n°IV/28.841, Commission Decision of April 
19, 1977 and Court of Justice, Case n°77/77, Benzine en Petroleum Handelsmaatschappij BV and 
others vs. Commission [1978]. 
14  European Commission, 2011, Standard & Poor’s, COMP/39592, 14 May. 
15  Furthermore, such a case could be analyzed also through the prism of exclusionary abuses. Indeed, 
S&P’s strategy could be considered as tying. S&P could increase its dominant position based on 
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2.1.2.  Why have exploitative and economic dependence cases disappeared? 
The EC’s overly cautious attitude to exploitative and economic dependence abuses, 
and thus, the disappearance of these abuses from case law can be explained by the 
hazards involved in identifying and remedying exploitation (Lyons, 2008). The EC is 
reluctant to mobilize these abuse theories because of the difficulties involved in de-
termining how to characterize an unfair price and how to demonstrate harm to com-
petition (Akman, 2009). For instance, Evans and Padilla (2005) illustrate the risks and 
costs of false convictions or acquittals which could be induced by flawed decision-
making criteria. 
There is an implicit underlying conception which might explain this disregard, namely 
the assumption that the exercise of economic power in an economic transaction has 
no impact on overall welfare but has only distributional consequences. This raises 
two different issues. First, if competition law enforcement focuses only on the net 
effects on welfare by a given market practice irrespective of its impact on distribu-
tion, exploitative abuses are outside the enforcers’ scope since they are alleged only 
to be distributional. Second, when exploitative abuses are (allegedly) related only to 
fairness considerations and not also to efficiency concerns, then, again, an effects-
based approach tends to exclude these types of abuses.  
A second explanation for the neglect of abuse of economic dependence cases in the 
decisional practices of competition authorities might be a reluctance to deal with 
issues that could be considered as linked more to contract law than to competition 
law. In a nutshell, an abuse of a dominant position is conditioned on the charac-
terization of that dominance in a given relevant market. A horizontal dimension is 
implied, ensuring both consumer welfare and the commercial partner involved in the 
transaction are affected by the practice. In contrast, at first sight an abuse of econo-
mic dependence involves only a vertical relationship between two partners along a 
supply chain. It may not affect any relevant markets and inflict harm only on a given 
undertaking.  
                                                          
the financial codes segment (i.e. based on its legal monopoly) to a competitive position (financial 
information). 
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Furthermore, a third line of explanation may stem from the concept of an error-cost 
framework (Bougette et al., 2015). The standard of proof historically used in exploi-
tative abuse cases is seen as being far weaker than that imposed by the effects-based 
approach. Such a less rigorous standard of proof, however, may lead to decisions 
that are not sufficiently grounded in sound economic analysis. The uncertainty about 
the theory of competitive damage may lead, also, to inappropriate remedies that 
could harm consumers (Lianos and Lombardi, 2016). At the same time, correcting 
the contracting disequilibria among commercial partners in a vertical supply chain 
implies that competition authorities perform a trade-off between fairness-related 
concerns and economic efficiency. Since there is no way to balance these conflicting 
objectives, the risk is excessive room for the judges’ discretion. 
 
2.2. Economic reasons for reinvigorating competition policy on exploitative 
and economic dependence abuses 
However, exploitative and economic dependence related abuses can have significant 
effects on overall welfare. Ignoring such abuses as potential anticompetitive behavior 
per se, violates the fundamental idea of the effects-based approach, namely that 
actual effects should trump formalistic assertions. Depending on the case in ques-
tion, consumer welfare and the competition process may be negatively affected by 
exploitative and economic dependence abuses in several ways. 
(1) Such abuses may indirectly impair consumer welfare through three channels: (i) 
increased prices, (ii) reduced choices, and (iii) limited innovation incentives. 
Squeezed downstream companies may feel forced to pass through power-ba-
sed mark-ups to consumers. Squeezed upstream firms may be restricted in their 
abilities and incentives to invest and innovate. Niche suppliers may exit the mar-
ket because they may not be able to cope with the enforced conditions, thus 
reducing choice for consumers (and reducing competition, at least in some po-
ckets or segments of heterogeneous markets). Also, if the consumer is the de-
pendent, exploited economic actor, the negative consumer welfare effects are 
apparent. Obviously, negative consumer welfare effects are not automatic. For 
instance, a recent study casts doubt on the impact of increased concentration 
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at the retail level on the prices paid by final consumers (Ciapanna and Rondi-
nelli, 2014). Similarly, an EC (2014) report on modern retail challenges the as-
sumed adverse consequences in the food sector of retailer concentrations on 
consumers’ range of choices and on the incentives to innovate for producers. 
However, neither of these studies implies that there cannot be negative effects 
in other cases. 
(2) The competition process itself may be harmed if such abuses impair firms’ capa-
cities to access the market. In this sense, an abuse of economic dependence 
must be sanctioned on a competition law basis since the freedom to compete 
in the market is threatened. In this perspective, “the concentration of economic 
powers in the hand of private economic entities affects not only the structure 
of the market, but also the individual freedoms of market participants” (Bak-
houm 2015, p. 21). Preserving market access cannot be seen as a non-economic 
goal of antitrust legislation which can be criticized for an induced trade-off with 
economic efficiency. Instead, freedom to access the market (contestability) is 
considered a necessary condition for efficiency and long-run welfare. 
(3) Distribution affects efficiency. The dividing line between efficiency and wealth 
distribution concerns is not so obvious. The effects-based approach is used to 
assess the net effects on welfare of pricing practices as, for instance, in the case 
of exclusionary prices. The as-efficient competitor test helps competition law 
enforcers to sanction exclusionary abuses without the risk of unduly protecting 
weak competitors at the expense of final consumers. In a nutshell, assessing the 
net effects of an exclusionary practice may provide practical decision rules and 
open the door to an efficiency-based defense. Along the same lines, the net 
effects of exploitative or economic dependence related abuses determine their 
anti- or procompetitive character. Distributional wealth transfer enforced by su-
perior economic power can have implications for economic efficiency. If com-
petition had been based on merit, a specific wealth transfer would not be ob-
served and the weaker party might have been better placed to invest and to 
innovate. Similarly, this exercise of market power can have distorting effects on 
the competition among customers, especially if discriminatory practices were 
applied. 
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(4) Economic power itself might be a welfare concern. An unconstrained exercise 
of private economic power could induce regulatory harm distinct from any wel-
fare harm in the affected relevant markets (Nachbar, 2013). Such a considera-
tion could be linked to the current legal and economic literature which consi-
ders economic power to be an issue in and of itself (Khan and Vaheesan, 2017). 
Negative welfare effects of accumulation of market power include, inter alia, 
increased lobbying and regulatory biases, and a shift in resources-use from mar-
ket competition towards achieving and securing noncompetitive institutional 
(or other) privileges.16  
(5) In addition, concentration of economic power can have a significant impact on 
welfare. For instance, empirical studies using U.S. data demonstrate that mark-
ups decreased between the 1950s and the early 1980s, and increased thereafter 
(De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017). In 2014, the higher the market share of an 
undertaking, the higher were its mark-ups (which contrasts to the situation in 
the early 1980s). Over the last 35 years, the mark-up increase has accounted for 
a yearly 1 percent rise in final consumer prices. As a consequence of the increa-
sed market power, productivity gains (3% to 4% per year) did not yield lower 
prices. This in turn has led to wealth transfers between consumers and firms, 
which can cause macroeconomic imbalances (Piketty 2014; Khan and Vaheesan 
2017). Also, the recent economic literature emphasizes various negative welfare 
effects (on macroeconomic as well as on dynamic welfare) from an increase in 
industry concentration and market power across many markets, particularly in 
the U.S. but also internationally (although more mixed across Europe, see Val-
letti 2017; Weche & Wambach 2018), which are considerably weakening the 
process of competition (Autor et al. 2017a, 2017b; Grullon et al. 2017; 
Gutiérrez & Philippon 2017, 2018).17  
(6) It is possible also, that in the long run the frequent and non-sanctioned occur-
rence of abusive strategies may lead to an erosion of the “moral of the market” 
and results in loss of faith within society regarding the view of markets and 
                                                          
16  See e.g. what Zingales (2017) calls a broader “political theory” of the firm. 
17 Grullon et al. (2017) explicitly blame lax enforcement of antitrust regulation as one of the reasons 
for this development. 
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competition as coordination mechanisms. In particular, the exploitative abuse 
of dependent “Davids” by dominant “Goliaths” is likely to considerably violate 
widespread societal perceptions of fairness. It is likely that the negative welfare 
effects from public opinion and voters increasingly favoring anticompetitive re-
gulation (which influences populist and other manifestos as well as election 
outcomes and subsequent policies) will quickly outweigh the marginal effi-
ciency losses from granting economic-dependent companies more breathing 
space. 
Overall, the concentration and exercise of economic power are relevant issues in the 
context of competition law. Protection of the competitive process in itself and for 
itself is a relevant objective for competition law enforcement even though there is 
not always a clear and direct impact on consumer welfare. Furthermore, efficiency-
related concerns may be indirect. The notion in EC case law of the special responsi-
bility of the dominant undertaking regarding maintenance of an effective competi-
tion is thus reconfirmed. It follows from the above that the responses of competition 
law to exploitative abuses or abuses of economic dependence positions should not 
be limited to direct efficiency-related considerations. Exploitative abuses and abuses 
of economic dependence can potentially affect competition and welfare in a negative 
way and, thus, should be within the scope of competition law. 
 
2.3. Some examples of exploitative and economic dependence abuses in EU 
case law 
In order to illustrate the increasing relevance of exploitative and economic depen-
dence related abuses, we argue in this section that the digital economy is subject to 
such problems due to the emergence and different roles of new intermediaries. One 
of the unexpected consequences of the current convergence between online and 
offline commercial activities is that the risk of the occurrence of such a practice is 
increasing (from offline to online retailing) both in terms of the number of affected 
relevant markets but also in terms of intensity. According to industrial economics, 
several factors promote the market power of online platforms in the digital economy 
(see inter alia, Evans and Schmalensee, 2007; Haucap and Heimeshoff, 2014; Haucap 
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and Stühmeier, 2016) including: strong direct network effects, strong and symmetric 
indirect network effects, single-homing by customer groups (including commercial 
customers), homogeneity of customer preferences and platform services, incompati-
bility among platforms and high switching costs, and weak innovation dynamics. The 
more these factors characterize a platform and the stronger these factors are pro-
nounced, the higher is its market power and the stronger is the dependence of the 
economic actors on all market sides. 
In April 2018, the EC published an impact assessment of digital platforms.18 The EC 
underlined the importance of e-commerce platforms for sellers, especially small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) (for which trading on the dominant e-commerce 
platform is an essential step to accessing the market). Its inquiry into trading prac-
tices (Communication COM (2016) 288, 25 May 2016) led to its expressing some 
concern over the damages that SMEs can suffer as the result of unbalanced contracts.  
2.3.1. Unilateral, frequent, and unannounced changes to contractual terms  
This concern echoes the concepts in legal theory of unconscionable contract and 
contract of adhesion. The first can be defined as a contract which is so harsh and 
unfair to one of the parties that no reasonable person would freely and knowingly 
agree to it. The second corresponds to an arrangement offered by the party who 
benefits from the stronger bargaining position on a take-it-or-leave-it basis and wit-
hout any capacity to negotiate terms with its counterpart.19 
As the EC underlines, these unilateral practices can emerge during the pre-contract 
period (e.g. refusal to negotiate), during negotiation of the contract (e.g. lack of 
clarity in contractual provisions), during the period of the contract (e.g. unilateral 
changes, lack of prior notice about changes), and at contract termination (e.g. uni-
lateral termination). For instance, European Commission (2017a, p. 25) reveals that 
“online platforms usually reserve for themselves the right to change their [terms & 
conditions] and may refuse to negotiate such changes”. It is possible also, that one 
                                                          
18  European Commission, Impact assessment – promoting fairness and transparency for business 
users of online intermediation services, SWD (2018) 138 final, Brussels, 26.4.2018; European Com-
mission, Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on promoting 
fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services, COM(2018) 238 
final, 2018/0112 (COD), Brussels, 26 April 2018. 
19  According to European Commission (2017a), only 13% of the surveyed marketplaces allow nego-
tiation and among these only 10% of the negotiations are effective. 
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form of abuse based on higher bargaining power could be depriving sellers of op-
portunities for redress by imposing excessive liability disclaimers, or by choosing non-
EU jurisdictions to settle disputes. 
 
2.3.2. Delisting threats 
Products can be withdrawn unilaterally from the marketplace or the seller account 
can be suspended without proper prior notification or without provision of a clear 
statement of reasons and without due process allowing the decision to be challen-
ged. The litigation between Google-AdWords and Navx before the French Competi-
tion Authority is an example of such risks.20 The alleged exclusionary effect consisted 
of a sudden termination of Navx’s AdWords contract. This capacity to delist a product 
and to impede access to the market is one of the main components of abuse of 
economic dependence strategies which bricks-and-mortar stores and centralized 
procuring agencies may face. 
Amazon’s fight with various publishers in the e-books market may serve as another 
illustrative example. In several cases where publishing houses did not agree with the 
changes to contractual conditions demanded by Amazon (e.g. Melville House in 
2005, and both Hachette and Bonnier in 2014), Amazon tried to “discipline” them 
by arbitrary delistings and threats to delist a range of these publishers’ titles. It com-
bined these threats with obvious handicapping means such as, inter alia, artificial 
increases (up to several months) in delivery times, deactivation of buy-buttons (they 
appear but the customer is unable to click on them), biased search results, and the 
placing of pop-up advertisements for similar titles from ‘compliant’ publishers or 
Amazon’s own publishing services (overshadowing titles from the threatened publi-
shers). These actions harm consumer welfare by confusing the customer and impo-
sing unnecessary transaction costs on them, and generally are discriminatory and 
inappropriate (Budzinski and Köhler, 2015). 
2.3.3. Ranking and search biases  
                                                          
20  Autorité de la concurrence, Avis du 28 octobre 2010 relatif à des pratiques mises en œuvre dans 
le secteur de la publicité sur Internet. 
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In the online world, this issue is especially significant since access to consumers de-
pends largely on algorithm-based rankings of search results and recommendations 
provided by the platforms.21 The EC’s Google Shopping decision22 issued in June 
2017 testifies to the difficulties involved in holding search or ranking algorithms ac-
countable. In the case of marketplaces, sellers may find it difficult to identify the 
criteria being considered in the algorithms and how they are weighted. This opacity 
facilitates rankings manipulations which distort competition. Additionally, the plat-
form may offer additional services to favor better visibility of the seller’s offer against 
additional payments (European Commission, 2017a).23 Indeed, paid-for ranking de-
vices can raise significant competition concerns. 
The issues related to the offline segment involving national brands or private labels 
suppliers can be exacerbated in the online environment.24 The risk of anticompetitive 
discrimination and distortion increases if the platform acts in a dual role, for instance, 
as the marketplace organizer and as a seller on this marketplace with its own shop(s) 
(see e.g. Faherty et al., 2017) – like for instance Amazon with the dualism of its online 
retailing business and its marketplace. In such constellations, the platform experi-
ences incentives to introduce a discriminatory bias. The platform may manipulate the 
algorithm-based search or recommendation results in a way that the goods (pro-
ducts, contents or services) of its competitors in upstream or downstream markets 
(for instance, the shops competing to its own shop) are disadvantaged and its own 
goods are favored. The Google Shopping case, and especially the demotion issue 
(based on the Panda algorithm) is illustrative. Google also acts in a dual role – as the 
provider of the search engine Google Search and as the provider of its own Google 
Shopping price comparison service. Thus, it may abuse its dual role power by assig-
ning systematically lower ranking positions to competitors to Google Shopping via 
                                                          
21  European Commission (2018a, p. 13) reveals that the top 5 results attract 88% of the clicks. The 
probability that a user clicks anywhere beyond the 10th rank equals 1%. 
22  European Commission Google Search (Shopping), case AT.39740, 27 June 2017. 
23  These offers may include presentation in a specific box on the platform’s website. These boxes can 
hide the general ranking results. In addition, the allocation of these boxes or spaces is even less 
transparent than the functioning of the general algorithm. 
24 For an analysis of the effects of the development of private labels in the offline line commerce 
segment on the downstream buyer power see Scott-Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004). 
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Google Search’s search results. 25 Similar mechanisms may be used to sanction a 
“non-cooperative” bargaining partner.  
 
2.3.4. Imposing costly or useless auxiliary services 
Platforms may impose mandatory services upon commercial users, which are either 
more expensive than the competitive price or of limited usefulness. Delivery and pay-
ment services are common examples. This practice can be analyzed as a tying strategy 
leading to artificially increased costs for sellers using the platform. If these sellers are 
competing with the platform’s downstream services, then this can be analyzed in 
terms of a raising rivals costs strategy, cross-subsidizing mechanisms, or at the ext-
reme, margin squeeze practices (by a vertically-integrated firm controlling an essen-
tial facility in the upstream market). It may lead also to exploitative abuses. These 
auxiliary services may be the lever used to extract a part of the seller’s surplus realized 
through the platform. If this is the only way to access the market, the platform ma-
nager enjoys gatekeeper rights which allow it to tax platform users.  
 
2.3.5. Prohibitive switching costs and personalized data 
Personalized data represents an important resource for the online economy (inter 
alia, Budzinski & Kuchinke 2018; Budzinski & Stöhr 2018). A dominant e-commerce 
platform may take control of any contact between a supplier and its (final) customers 
and, thus, may deprive it of access to customers’ personal data and online behavior, 
etc. The supplier can access these valuable data only through the dominant platform; 
should it switch platforms then these data become inaccessible. This questions the 
efficiency of multi-homing strategies since it divides the market and reinforces de-
pendence on the focal platform by increasing switching costs hugely if the firm de-
cides to withdraw from this platform. Furthermore, such policies can reduce the sel-
ler’s capacity to negotiate better deals with customers outside the platform. In addi-
tion, they reinforce the dependence of sellers on the platform especially if the con-
sumers tend to privilege the platform rather than the sellers’ website, and if they 
                                                          
25  Automatic algorithms may be affected by “editorial correcting and complementing of their results” 
(European Commission, 2017a, p. 21) in order to favor own or cooperative sellers over their com-
petitors. 
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have a preference for single-homing. The EC (2017a, p. 28) refers to the “inability to 
access transaction data and/or use them outside the platform impedes the business 
users’ ability to measure their performance, to develop new business strategies and 
business models, better respond to market trends, improve products or develop new 
ones.” 
In addition, the supplier will be increasingly dependent on the platform for its mar-
keting campaigns and commercial strategies.26 The platform may commercialize high 
value-added services which the supplier (especially SMEs) cannot refuse to buy. The 
data (or the capta) are an increasing part of the economic surplus created by the 
transaction as they can be re-used for future transactions with both the focal consu-
mer and other consumers based on profiling strategies. 
 
3. THE NEW INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION APPROACH AND HOW TO CHARAC-
TERIZE EXPLOITATIVE AND ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ABUSES 
Under case-law, two conditions are usually used to describe a situation of economic 
dependence: i) the supplier’s production factors cannot be used or adapted for the 
production of other goods at an economically acceptable cost, (ii) for a given supp-
lier, there are no comparable retailers for the goods it is offering. These criteria refer 
to specific capacity investments which suppliers are required to make in distributors. 
However, these case-law originated criteria do not match the proposals in the eco-
nomic literature. This section proposes a theoretical approach (section 3.1) and il-
lustrates it by the examples of the agrifood sector and the digital economy (sections 
3.2 and 3.3). 
Given the contractual structure, the first instrument used to measure economic de-
pendence is risk rate – also called the threat rate. It measures the proportion of the 
business of a supplier with a dominant retailer, i.e. the share of its turnover related 
to the distribution through the dominant retailing platform (Këllezi 2008, p. 70). The 
higher the risk rate the more the producer’s viability will be jeopardized in the event 
                                                          
26  A parallel can be drawn with negotiations between Google (or another aggregator) and the press 
industry on the issue of commercialization of subscriptions or payments using the “click model” 
i.e. article by article. In these two cases, the platform centralized customer data, a model that 
attracted criticism from media industry players. 
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of a breach of contract. Indeed, the producer will be economically dependent since 
it might find it difficult to switch from one retailer to another especially in the case 
of large orders. For any supplier, it is possible to calculate a series of risk rates. Similar 
to the Herfindahl-Hirschman index in the case of merger control, the risk rate allows 
for an initial screening to identify and justify situations of economic dependency. 
However, it does not capture the complexity of different contractual situations and 
different industry dynamics. 
Therefore, a theoretical definition of the economic dependence of an independent 
supplier with respect to one retailer can be based on the concept of specific assets 
(Williamson, 1985). The criterion related to economic dependence is the redeplo-
yable nature of the technology for another product or volume, or for an order from 
another client. Independent suppliers invest in order to be able to supply large retai-
lers. When designed as part of a bilateral contractual relationship, such investments 
expose the supplier to opportunism from the retailer which can exploit a dependence 
introduced by mutual specific assets. 
 
3.1. Efficiency concerns related to exploitative abuses: buyer power through 
bargaining power 
Modern IO theory analyzes the concept of economic dependence using a vertical 
chain perspective.27 Dependence can be explained as an imbalance in the contractual 
relationship between a producer and a retailer. While a structural approach intro-
duces this imbalance with a cost asymmetry among suppliers and retailers, a bargai-
ning approach investigates how in oligopolistic markets large firms can have greater 
bargaining power than small firms. Since market power may exist in the upstream 
(concentration of producers) or in the downstream (concentration of retailers) mar-
kets, the imbalance may stem from two different sources (table 1). The majority of 
analyses focus on situations of few suppliers and many buyers, i.e. an oligopoly (e.g. 
Belleflamme and Peitz, 2015). Alternatively, situations of oligopsony, which are less 
prevalent in the literature, refer to markets including few buyers (retailers in this case) 
                                                          
27  For a discussion of the benefits of and limits to modern IO to competition policy, see for instance 
Budzinski (2011). 
 
 
17 
 
and many suppliers (producers). In this paper we focus on economic dependence 
resulting from buyers’ bargaining power (oligopsony). Note, however, that this mar-
ket configuration does not result systematically in an anticompetitive outcome, for 
instance, procompetitive effects are possible whenever upstream competition is 
weak. 
TABLE 1: ASYMMETRIC MARKET STRUCTURE 
 
Upstream Downstream 
Bargaining power 
Few sellers Many buyers 
(oligopoly problem: retailers face powerful supp-
liers) 
Many sellers Few buyers 
(oligopsony problem: suppliers face powerful 
retailers) 
 
An important strand of the economic literature discusses vertical bargaining games. 
The joint negotiation of price and quantity (which may also include other contract 
terms) is modeled employing a bilateral Nash-bargaining between manufacturers 
and retailers (see among others Horn and Wolinsky, 1988). For instance, an input 
supplier negotiates with a downstream producer. If an agreement is reached on a 
market, a fixed benefit from cooperation is shared by the negotiating parties. Chae 
and Heidhues (2004) use this framework to analyze buyers’ incentives to form alli-
ances among SMEs. Furthermore, there is a growing body of literature that analyzes 
the effects of buyer power on prices and welfare (von Ungern-Sternberg, 1996; Dob-
son and Waterson, 1997; Inderst and Wey, 2007). In line with John Kenneth Gal-
braith’s (1952) work, this literature shows the existence of countervailing power: “In 
the typical modern market of few sellers, the active restraint [on the exercise of pri-
vate economic power] is provided not by competitors but from the other side of the 
market by strong buyers”. Therefore, a decrease in the number of retailers may have 
beneficial effects for consumers since larger retailers can extract lower prices from 
18 
 
their suppliers.28 In addition, buyer power can strengthen suppliers’ incentives to in-
vest in capacity or to adopt new technologies with lower marginal costs. 
Chen et al. (2016) show that buyer power and downstream competition can be 
considered substitutes. They model downstream competition in the case of one large 
retailer. Consumer welfare improves following an increase in the buyer power of the 
large retailer. Increased competition among retailers forces the large retailer to 
bargain harder with its supplier to obtain a lower input price which further reduces 
retail prices.  
In settings where downstream buyers put a high value on the future and internalize 
the benefits of supporting a certain number of suppliers, Mérel and Sexton (2017) 
show that retailer firms have no incentive to exercise buyer power. This would the 
reduce rates of return on investment below ‘normal’ levels, and would lead them to 
exit the market or would attenuate their entry rate which would be damaging for 
the downstream buyers’ substantial sunk investments. Thus, increasing buyer con-
centration can benefit input producers by allowing buyers to avoid the ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ and internalize the benefits from paying prices that insure the profi-
tability of the upstream suppliers. Many agricultural product markets are represen-
tative of such settings. Also, vertical integration could be a response to securing a 
stable supply of the agricultural input. 
What if retailers decide to merge? Assuming that retailers are local monopolists ope-
rating in separate markets, Inderst and Wey (2003, 2007) show that a downstream 
merger will increase the upstream firms’ incentives to reduce their marginal costs. 
Asymmetries among retailers, with some large buyers and some smaller ones simul-
taneously active and facing different input prices, may lead to a “waterbed effect” 
(Inderst and Valetti, 2011). If a large firm exercises its bargaining power, the terms 
for its competitors may be deteriorated enough to eventually increase the average 
retail price, which in the end harms consumers.29 
                                                          
28  Unlike work which adopts a linear form of demand, Gaudin (2017) shows that countervailing buyer 
power arises in equilibrium for a broad class of demand forms, and its magnitude depends on the 
degree of product differentiation. 
29  See Allain et al. (2017) for empirical evidence of increased prices following mergers in the French 
grocery retail sector. This study challenges the results of the Modern Retail enquiry (European 
Commission, 2014). 
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A more flexible alternative to merging is an alliance (Caprice and Rey, 2015). 
Downstream firms enhance their collective bargaining position at the expense of 
their suppliers. With regard to retailers, there are two advantages from an “alliance 
strategy”. First, firms benefit from associated economies of scale. Second, they can 
make a joint delisting decision (i.e. to remove goods from the shelves). This delisting 
threat significantly increases their bargaining power, and retailers do use delisting as 
a bargaining strategy: the risk of a manufacturer going bankrupt if delisted by a large 
supermarket is real. Caprice and Rey (2015) show that joint delisting decisions in-
crease the bargaining positions of the group’s members.30 This improved bargaining 
position can put suppliers in a position of economic dependence and also does not 
favor consumers since delisting decisions do not necessarily lead to lower retail pri-
ces. 
 
3.2. Application to the agri-food sector 
Rogers and Sexton (1994) identify structural features specific to the agri-food sector 
which reflect theoretical reasoning. First, products are often perishable; they are dif-
ficult and costly to store and transport. Packing facilities or processors (e.g. slaught-
erhouses for meat products) are located in geographic proximity to farms and there-
fore may exert buyer power over farms in their vicinity. Second, in many cases, an 
intermediary between producer and distributor such as a processor will emerge. 
These intermediates are specialized and can exercise significant market power, ulti-
mately leading to a triple margin on products along the value chain. Third, producers 
such as farmers need specific assets and thus face high sunk costs. Barriers to entry 
in these sectors are relatively high. Finally, as a response, new players have emerged 
to counterbalance the bargaining power in place. For example, purchasing coopera-
tives or associations of producers have emerged, entailing their own problems in 
relation to competition. These four characteristics, Rogers and Sexton (1994) argue, 
justify intervention by public authorities to promote competition in the upstream 
industry and to develop means of countervailing powers. 
                                                          
30  For a survey of different buyer power abuses and their effects on suppliers, see Nicholson and 
Young (2012, p. 6). Delisting threats constitute an abuse. Large retailers also can demand slotting 
fees, retrospective discounts, or after-sale rebates. 
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Processors can play the role of gatekeepers and may enjoy significant market power 
(Armstrong and Wright, 2007). These vertical dimensions require an analysis of the 
global value chain (De Backer and Miroudot, 2014). In this perspective, the vertical 
relationship between producers and retailers can be categorized to distinguish, for 
instance, market-based models of governance, relational markets, and captive mar-
kets (Lianos and Lombardi (2016). The last model category is the most relevant for 
our analysis. In contrast to a relational model31, the relationship between producer 
and retailer (which has undertaken specific investments) is very precarious. The im-
portance of criteria for the origins of the dependence and requirements in terms of 
compulsory notice and stand-still periods prior to putting an end to the relationship 
can be explained in this type of framework. According to Vogel (2016), the challenge 
is to separate legitimate competition law enforcement from the incorporation of 
concerns based on the requirements of contractual protectionism. 
In the early 1980s, the new empirical IO (NEIO) approach was pioneered by Appel-
baum (1982), Bresnahan (1982), and Lau (1982) to assess the degree of market 
power of a specific industry in the output market under specific assumptions related 
to demand, cost functions, and strategic interactions among firms. While the first 
studies concerned oligopolistic settings, empirical work soon emerged on oligopsony 
power in the retail food industry (inter alia, Just and Chern, 1980 (tomatoes); Love 
and Murniningtyas, 1992 (wheat); Wann and Sexton, 1992 (pears); Cakir and Balag-
tas, 2012 (milk)). Most empirical studies show some presence of oligopsony power.32 
Gohin and Guyomard (2000) were the first to apply NEIO methods to the retail 
grocery sector and food products such as dairy and meat. Based on the assumption 
of quantity competition, they found that French food retailers do not behave com-
petitively. They show also that more than 17% of the wholesale-to-retail price mar-
gins for dairy and meat products can be attributed to oligopoly-oligopsony distorti-
ons. Another study stressing the specificities of the agri-food sector is Richards et al. 
                                                          
31  The relational model stresses the significant role of relations in informal agreements and unwritten 
codes of conduct: “In the absence of third‐party enforcement, markets resemble a collection of 
bilateral trading islands rather than a competitive market” (Brown et al., 2004, pp. 747). 
32  An in-depth technical survey of market power estimations is beyond the scope of the present ar-
ticle. See, for instance, Perloff et al. (2007) who propose different approaches to modeling and 
assessing market power. 
 
 
21 
 
(2001), which analyzes the frozen potato processing market in Washington DC and 
shows that potato processors behave as an oligopsony in relation to acquiring raw 
potato stock. Furthermore, “processors are able to collude and offer potato prices 
below the competitive level and, somewhat perversely, suggest that the bargaining 
process may indeed be a facilitating mechanism for this collusion” (Richards et al., 
2001, p. 269). The presence of an oligopsonistic-colluding processor market struc-
ture reduced growers’ surplus by approximately 1.6 percent of market revenue per 
month.  
Delors (2007) evaluates economic dependence based on the diversification of inde-
pendent supplier outlets. Their database includes 942 private label French products 
from year 2004. Data limitations do not allow an assessment of alternative technical 
and commercial solutions or calculation of the costs and time involved in finding a 
new retailer. Thus, the evaluation of economic dependence is focused on the diver-
sification of independent suppliers’ outlets. The variety of outlets provides an indica-
tor of SME economic dependence which is reduced when each contract represents a 
smaller share of the independent supplier’s turnover. The results show that in terms 
of number of contracts, independent suppliers mainly adopt a strategy of outlet 
diversification which should protect them from economic dependence. 
Florez-Acosta and Herrera-Araujo (2017) provide an empirical examination of the 
effects of product delisting on consumer shopping behavior when consumers are 
able to source multiple stores. Based on scanner data on grocery purchases by French 
households in 2005, their results mitigate the importance of delisting as a credible 
strategy. They show that delisting a product whose customers are loyal to the brand 
can be detrimental for the manufacturer and for the supermarket. If consumers are 
able to find an alternative store which supplies the missing product, it will be the 
retailer that is likely to suffer most from its strategic decision. 
Competition authorities have also been interested in assessing market power in the 
grocery retail sector. In 2008, the UK Competition Commission launched the Groce-
ries Market Investigation. The authority analyzed prices negotiated between super-
markets and their suppliers. They found buyer power to be absent in the case of 
branded products with a single supplier but to matter for private label products 
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where suppliers compete. What matters more than buyer size alone is the combina-
tion of buyer size and choice of supplier (Davis and Reilly, 2010). In the same vein, 
Noton and Elberg (2018) investigate the profit-sharing behavior of bargainers in a 
vertical relationship. In the case of the Chilean coffee market, they found that large 
retailers did not extract most of the channel surplus from small manufacturers. Their 
results are in line with the notion of brand loyalty playing a key role in profit-sharing 
between retailers and manufacturers. 
Two other examples of scrutiny of the grocery sector by a competition authority stem 
from the French competition agency. The first refers to an opinion which concluded 
that the Paris market was highly concentrated. The competition authority proposed 
a new instrument to intervene in the market structure i.e. the structural injunction.33 
The second example is a March 2015 opinion where the competition authority iden-
tified certain competitive risks which could arise from cooperation agreements 
among grocery retailers including the risks of coordination among distributors and 
limitations on supply in upstream markets. According to the authority, although 
these agreements could generate significant gains in terms of reducing purchasing 
costs, the likelihood that they would generate overall efficiency gains that could off-
set the identified risks remained uncertain.34 
 
3.3. Application to the digital economy 
The issue of economic dependence is especially important in the digital economy 
where “strong, data-driven network effects reinforce this dependency and together 
these effects lead to an imbalance in bargaining power” (European Commission, 
2018, p. 10). While online platforms appear concentrated on few operators, more 
than one million merchants in the EU compete on them. Two-thirds of internet users 
made online purchases in 2016 and the value of this market was assessed at over 
EUR 500 billion by the EC. In Germany, 37% of internet sales are accounted for by 
only three platforms. In 2016, online booking channels accounted for 49% of all 
                                                          
33  Autorité de la concurrence, Avis du 11 janvier 2012 relatif à la situation concurrentielle dans le 
secteur de la distribution alimentaire à Paris. 
34  Autorité de la concurrence, Avis n° 15-A-06 du 31 mars 2015 relatif au rapprochement des cen-
trales d’achat et de référencement dans le secteur de la grande distribution. 
 
 
23 
 
travel bookings in the EU. The significance of seller dependence increases with strong 
concentration at the platform level. Since sellers (or app developers) cannot organize 
themselves to counterbalance the platforms’ bargaining power, they face a compe-
tition bottleneck (Armstrong, 2006). For instance, in 2016 Amazon had a 20 percent 
market share of total online sales in the EU. Its market share in Germany has reached 
40 percent (Dutch-Brown, 2017b, p. 4). 
As platforms compete aggressively for consumers, they recoup the price cuts by im-
posing higher costs on the sellers’ side or by reducing the quality of the services 
provided. As the online retail market becomes increasingly concentrated sellers can-
not react by applying a multi-homing strategy, especially if consumers show a prefe-
rence for single-homing and one-stop-shopping options (see e.g. Dutch Brown, 
2017a, p. 25) which weakens the seller’s position even more (i.e. platform depen-
dence increases because consumers are accessible only through a particular plat-
form). Platforms have significant interest in offering consumers the equivalent of an 
‘exclusive contract’ as proposed by Armstrong and Wright (2007), based for instance 
on loyalty discount schemes. 
Dutch-Brown (2017b) shows that this recoupment may have not only distributional 
effects but also efficiency-related ones. Platforms’ unfair commercial practices can 
have adverse effects on the quality of the service they provide to sellers which can 
reduce sellers’ revenues. In other words, the platform discriminates among users pro-
viding the desired quality for the single-homing side and a sub-optimal level for the 
multi-homing side. Indeed, buyers (for which the platform competes fiercely) search 
for simple functionalities (search, navigation) while sellers (for which the platform 
becomes a competition bottleneck) may “need more sophisticated services related 
to marketing, accounting transparency in pricing and product listing” (Dutch-Brown, 
2017b). Such services may be poor unless sellers agree to pay the (exploitative) price 
of (bundles of) auxiliary services. 
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There is a growing economic literature on online resale price maintenance combined 
with an agency model.35 The price parity clause (PPC) applied in this context has come 
under scrutiny. Two forms of PPC have been investigated. First, a “wide” PPC requi-
ring that the price a firm charges on the platform must be no higher than the price 
the same firm would charge for the same good sold through any other channel in-
cluding direct sale and sale on a rival platform. Second, a “narrow” PPC requires only 
that the price the firm sets on the platform must be no higher than the price the firm 
charges when it sells directly. These types of restrictions are known also as most-
favored customer or best-price clauses (Ezrachi, 2015) and can be seen as aggravat-
ing the dependence of retailers upon platforms. 
Wang and Wright (2017) analyze these clauses by modeling a search platform inclu-
ding the possibility of “showrooming”, i.e. free riding behavior consisting of sear-
ching for a suitable good on the platform and then buying directly from the seller 
and avoiding the platform fee. In this context, a (narrow or wide) PPC removes the 
gain that the consumer would acquire from showrooming. They show that the 
effects of PPCs are ambiguous. They find that consumers are harmed if a monopoly 
platform introduces a PPC of whatever form. However, when platforms compete, 
PPCs may be procompetitive depending on their form. Platform competition can be 
a countervailing power to platform fees – except in the case of a wide PPC because 
the constraint on fees implied by platform competition is removed. Furthermore, 
Boik and Corts (2016), Johnson (2017) and Foros (2017) show anticompetitive effects 
of wide PPCs in term sof higher fees and prices. However, Johansen and Vergé (2016) 
argue that such restraints may benefit consumers in certain circumstances, leading 
to lower prices. Their model is closely related to Boik and Corts (2016) and Johnson 
(2017) although with two major differences. First, they allow suppliers to sell both 
directly and through agents. Second, they do not assume that suppliers are always 
                                                          
35  Resale price maintenance (RPM) mechanisms can be considered unlawful under EU competition 
law. Any efficiency-based defense (e.g. protecting investments against free-riding strategies, pre-
serving brand reputation) must be balanced against anticompetitive effects on the downstream 
market (obstructing intrabrand competition). One of the hottest antitrust issues is related to the 
use of price-monitoring and price-setting algorithms to ensure each seller complies with the ag-
reements. See e.g. the EC decision of July 24, 2018, Asus, Denon & Marantz, Philips and Pioneer 
(cases AT.40465, 40469, 40181 and 40182) and the EC report on the E-Commerce Sector Inquiry 
(May 10, 2017, COM (2017) 229 final). See generally on the economics of price-setting algorithms 
Schwalbe (2018). 
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active on all platforms. Thus, they find that if each supplier can choose whether to 
list on both platforms or on only one in addition to selling directly, whether the PPC 
lead to higher or lower commissions depends on the degree of competition between 
suppliers. In particular, they show that PPC may lead simultaneously to higher profits 
for platforms and suppliers, and increase consumer surplus. 
 
The LEAR (2012) report commissioned by the UK Office of Fair Trade (OFT) underlines 
three anticompetitive effects outside the price effects: i) foreclosing entry of other 
platforms by reducing their ability to attract members, ii) facilitating collusion 
between platforms by improving their ability to monitor each other, iii) signaling 
information about platforms’ costs (i.e. the goods and services sold on that platform 
are not available at a lower price elsewhere). In relation to the procompetitive effects, 
protection of the platforms’ investments is important for building reliable platforms. 
 
The situation of sellers in the context of platforms may be unfavorable depending on 
the form of market structure. The higher the variety of the products requested by 
consumers, the lower the competitive pressure on sellers on the platform. In contrast, 
if consumers are more sensitive to price than to quality or diversity, the platform can 
extract a higher share of the surplus generated (Dutch-Brown, 2017a; Belleflamme 
and Peitz, 2018). The situation of a seller facing a bottleneck marketplace (due to the 
single-homing behavior of its users and prevailing network effects) is the same as 
that of a supplier in relation to a retailer. The cuts in retail prices imposed by 
downstream competitive pressure are passed through suppliers (see the above men-
tioned waterbed effect in Inderst and Valleti (2011)). The effects on welfare can be 
difficult to assess since the vertical restraints imposed on sellers may allow the plat-
form to propose exclusive contracts to buyers and by so doing may benefit all of its 
potential positive network effects (Dutch-Brown, 2017c). 
 
The European Commission (2017a) survey confirms seller’s fears about these prac-
tices and their effectiveness: 60% fear being delisted – many have encountered the 
difficulties quoted above. 75% of e-commerce marketplace heavy users (sellers) have 
experienced problems including technical problems (41%), lack of customer support 
(37%), lack of transparency related to platform data practices (28%), sudden changes 
to contractual terms or pricing (19%), unfair access conditions (15%), algorithmic 
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bias (12%), limitations on payment possibilities (11%), and discontinuation or sus-
pension of user account (11%). Regarding the seller’s perception of unfairness, the 
reasons for heavy users are: no possibility to negotiate terms and conditions (79%), 
possibility of unilateral changes made by the platform (57%), limited access to dis-
pute resolution procedures (49%), unfair pricing (43%), biased or non-transparent 
search practices (42%), limitations on consumer data (37%), limitations on payment 
possibilities (26%), termination provisions (24%), and so on. 
 
Dutch-Brown’s (2017c) econometric analysis shows that frequent changes in terms 
and conditions, a lack of reliable dispute resolution mechanism, and issues related 
to data portability are correlated to lower intensity of platform use. However, if 
multi-homing is the solution it should be remembered that users tend to single-
home, and that as Dutch-Brown (2017c, p. 25) shows, “firms that multi-home are 
more likely to face problems with platforms” (in terms of unfair trading practices). 
This can impede their market access or hinder their capacity to invest and to innovate. 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
Modern IO models demonstrate that vertical restrictions can have horizontal conse-
quences. It is not just a question of wealth transfer among vertically-related firms; it 
also involves effects on consumer welfare. The impacts of such exploitations of eco-
nomic power surface in terms of mark-ups (oligopoly power) or mark-downs (oligo-
psony power). The discussion in the preceding section shows that a variety of IO 
studies – both generally and in relation to our examples agri-food industries and the 
digital economy – offer conditions and criteria to distinguish between situations with 
pro- and such with anticompetitive effects. As a consequence, we should question 
the reluctance to implement the provisions of article 102 and the confinement of 
abuse of economic dependence cases in Member State legislation to the field of rest-
rictive practices. Given the emphasis on an effects-based and more-economic ap-
proach in European competition policy, the observed reluctance to apply modern IO 
insights to exploitative abuse and economic dependence cases appears astonishing.  
It might be explained first by a common feature of the entire effects-based approach. 
Despite the rise of modern IO models over the last 30 thirty years or more, some old-
style Chicago models continue to rule economic assessment of market practices in 
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antitrust rulings on exploitative abuse and economic dependence. In these contexts, 
IO models are often disregarded because they rely on what Fisher (1989) defines as 
exemplifying theory. They propose a case-by-case analysis of a market practice, based 
mainly on game-theoretical approaches backed by econometric calibration. Since 
their results are dependent on their hypotheses or chosen parameters, they are consi-
dered with caution by judges. Their complexity and their exemplifying nature raise 
concerns about arbitrating between models and the assessments proposed by each 
party to the litigation (Budzinski and Ruhmer, 2010). It is a question not only of the 
complexity of the economic reasoning involved (Baye and Wright, 2011) but also the 
robustness of the judicial adjudication. The main risk for the judge is seeing his or 
her decision overturned by an appeal court. 
Second, competition authorities may be reluctant to sanction these types of abuses 
because they appear to be related mainly to welfare transfer and not efficiency 
issues. While according to old-style Chicago School logic welfare transfer issues may 
be outside the scope of economic theory, modern IO theory clearly shows that they 
are accompanied by relevant efficiency and welfare effects. Considering wealth trans-
fers may create a margin of discretion for the judge involving the risk that a given 
judge may promote his or her own values or preferences. However, again, it is mainly 
a risk of seeing a ruling superseded in the appeals process. 
However, the two possible alternatives to employing competition law to combat ex-
ploitative and economic dependence abuses entail severe deficiencies. First, contract 
law would enable the resolution of contractual imbalances. However, does a judge 
act as a contract regulator making decisions about and changing contracts aimed at 
achieving a fair transaction? Second, there is sector-specific regulation. It is not obvi-
ous that efficient and effective sector specific regulation could be created in relation 
to economic fields not characterized by essential facilities or which do not induce a 
systemic risk for the whole economy. In addition, sector specific regulators are more 
easily captured by lobbies. Add to this information imperfections and the enforce-
ment of such regulation could (rather probably) lead to organized wealth transfers, 
the protection of uncompetitive companies (also through adverse selection and mo-
ral hazard problems), the generation of anticompetitive privileges, and altogether 
damage to the competition process at the expense of consumer welfare. Eventually, 
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relying on sector specific regulation is likely to induce excessive regulatory costs and 
excessive rigidities, especially in the context of the highly dynamic and innovative 
digital economy.  
The case for a competition policy treatment of exploitative and economic depen-
dence abuses is strengthened further by the indication that these abuses are not 
beyond the scope of the effects-based approach. In contrast, modern IO insights 
suggest that an economics-based approach is capable of effectively tackling these 
issues. On the one hand, we have shown that such vertical restrictive practices have 
negative effects on horizontal competition and welfare, in other words. First, restric-
tive practices implemented by a bottleneck player may reduce competition by favo-
ring its own subsidiaries even if it is less efficient than its competitors. Second, in the 
case of silo structured competition in which upstream good suppliers are dependent 
on downstream players, a downstream player might exploit the economic depen-
dency of its upstream partner to impose price decreases to preserve its own markup. 
The cost of the adjustment could be passed-through to the dependent player, redu-
cing its capacity to invest and to innovate, and thus further strengthening its depen-
dence. The downstream player may enjoy a relatively quiet life in terms of margins. 
The consequence will be negative dynamic welfare effects. 
However, we need to consider the downside of an effects-based approach that the 
defendants may engage in cherry-picking among economic models, searching for or 
“creating” a procompetitive explanation of their anticompetitive market behavior. 
The complexity, reliance of sound market data, and frequent inability to provide 
clear-cut and valid results imply that modern IO tools cannot solve every case in ques-
tion. Therefore, on the other hand, a strict case-by-case-analysis approach may not 
be optimal to manage abuses of economic power. Instead, a rules-based approach 
with theory-driven, rebuttable presumptions protecting economic-dependent play-
ers might be a useful second best option (Budzinski 2010). Although per se rules do 
not appear appropriate here, rebuttable presumptions based upon theory-driven 
case constellations and sets of criteria may be a reasonable way to reduce the pros-
pect of abuse of economic power bearing in mind the difficulties involved in chara-
cterizing such abuses and the risk of irreversible competitive damage. This would 
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apply particularly if IO theory suggests that a certain practice will lead to anticompe-
titive harm in the vast majority of realistic case constellations (Breyer 2010). A rebutt-
able rule then makes sure that the legal efforts (and the burden of proof) are focused 
on proving the exception rather than the rule. As another way to avoid some of the 
pitfalls of an effects-based approach, it may be reasonable to allocate the burden of 
evidence to the most powerful market players.  
Furthermore, the difficult but necessary objective to comply with society’s (not indi-
viduals’) fairness expectations needs to be reflected. In EU Commissioner for Compe-
tition Margaret Vestager’s words, “[...] competition enforcement also sends a mes-
sage of fairness. That's what President Juncker referred to last week as the social side 
of competition law”.36 Enforcement of competition law is not only a matter of tech-
nique; it is mainly the expression of a social choice among different combinations of 
efficiency and distribution which are considered by society to be reasonable. The role 
of legal rules (i.e. institutions) is to balance the different values and objectives in such 
an equilibrium. A comprehensive competition economics approach, embracing not 
only IO but also institutional and behavioral economics may be superior to create a 
sound framework for competition policy. 
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